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Sea-Level Rise and the Endangered Species Act
Dave Owen∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Through no fault of their own, piping plovers have chosen their
habitats poorly. Many piping plovers nest on ocean beaches, and
all piping plovers spend their winters foraging and sheltering on
dry beaches and in the adjacent intertidal zone.1 Consequently,
piping plovers are heavily dependent—for some populations,
entirely dependent—on habitats very close to sea level.2 Because
of widespread coastal development, these habitats have long been
under threat, and the threat has recently taken on an added
dimension. Rising sea levels, caused in part by greenhouse gas
emissions and associated climate change, are beginning to inundate
the piping plover’s present habitats.3 As its habitats disappear, the
piping plover may disappear as well.4
The piping plover is not alone in its plight.5 The Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(“FWS” and “NOAA Fisheries;” collectively “the Services”), the
two federal agencies with primary responsibility for protecting
threatened and endangered species, have not compiled any sort of
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1. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PIPING PLOVER (CHARADRIUS
MELODUS) 5-YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 17, 23–30 (2009),
http://www.fws.gov/northeast/endangered/PDF/Piping_Plover_five_year_revie
w_and_summary.pdf (describing the piping plover’s range and habitat needs).
Populations breeding in the upper Midwest rely on beaches and dunes adjacent
to freshwater, but spend their winters along the Gulf Coast. See id. at 13. The
intertidal zone is the area between the high- and low-tide lines.
2. See id. at 29–30.
3. Id. at 50–52.
4. See id. at 52 (“Sea-level rise poses a significant threat to all piping
plover populations during the migration and wintering portion of their life
cycle.”).
5. See Reed F. Noss, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Florida’s
Unenviable Position with Respect to Sea Level Rise, 107 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 3
(2011) (“[T]he impacts of sea level rise constitute one of the greatest potential
causes of global species extinctions and ecosystem disruption over coming
decades and centuries.”).
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comprehensive list of species imperiled by sea-level rise.6 But if
they did, the list would likely be quite long. Hawaiian monk seals,7
many species of sea turtles,8 Louisiana black bears,9 black
abalones,10 Atlantic sturgeon,11 and any species unique to the
Florida Keys12 would headline an extensive list of species whose
habitats may soon be inundated, infiltrated with saltwater, or
compressed between an encroaching ocean and the hard edges of
human development.13 Most, if not all, of those species were
already under threat, whether because of habitat alteration,
invasive species, pollution, or some combination of factors.14 For
some, the addition of rising seas may represent a tipping point
toward extinction.
This Essay addresses how environmental law is, or is not,
responding to that threat. I focus on the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), which serves as the last line of defense for many species
imperiled with extinction. At present, that defense is not
6. With some exceptions, FWS generally holds jurisdiction over terrestrial
and freshwater species, and NMFS generally holds jurisdiction over marine and
diadromous species.
7. Jason D. Baker et al., Potential Effects of Sea Level Rise on the
Terrestrial Habitats of Endangered and Endemic Megafauna in the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, 2 ENDANGERED SPECIES RES. 21 (2006)
(describing threats to Hawaiian monk seals and several other species).
8. Lucy A. Hawkes et al., Climate Change and Marine Turtles, 7
ENDANGERED SPECIES RES. 137, 138–39 (2009).
9. See Richard F. Keim et al., Ecological Consequences of Changing
Hydrological Conditions in Wetland Forests of Coastal Louisiana, in COASTAL
ENVIRONMENT AND WATER QUALITY 383–96 (Y.J. Xu & V.P. Singh eds., 2006)
(identifying sea-level rise as a threat to Louisiana’s coastal forests and black
bears as dependent upon those forests).
10. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for
Black Abalone, 74 Fed. Reg. 1937, 1939 (Jan. 14, 2009) (identifying sea-level
rise as a “medium threat” to the species).
11. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing
Determinations for Two Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon
(Acipenser oxyrinchus oxyrinchus) in the Southeast, 77 Fed. Reg. 5914, 5972
(Feb. 6, 2012).
12. See Joyce Maschinski et al., Sinking Ships: Conservation Options for
Endemic Taxa Threatened by Sea Level Rise, 107 CLIMATIC CHANGE 147, 148–
50 (2011) (discussing threats to Florida Keys species).
13. Because sea-level rise is a global problem, a full list would include
hundreds of species from other countries as well. See, e.g., Christina J.
Greenwood & Ishtiaq Uddin Ahmad, The Tigers of Bangladesh, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/news/bulletin-spring2010/thetigers-of-bangladesh.html (2010) (noting that sea-level rise threatens the
survival of the world’s largest remaining population of wild tigers).
14. In the course of researching for this Essay, I have not found any
documentation of a species imperiled exclusively by sea-level rise. Instead, sealevel rise is always one of several threats.
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particularly strong, for sea-level rise presents the Services with a
very difficult dilemma. An aggressive regulatory response might
help protect species, but the practical and political barriers to
aggressive regulation are daunting.15 Consequently, the Services,
though quite willing to acknowledge the gravity of the threat, have
studiously eschewed any attempt to invoke their regulatory powers
to respond to sea-level rise.16 Instead, they have used information
and persuasion as their primary means of changing the ways that
public and private entities manage the coastal zone.17 That softer
approach comports with a widely-shared sense that the future of
environmental law lies in collaborative, adaptive, and cooperative
alternatives to traditional regulation.18 And, of course, it
acknowledges the political controversies surrounding biodiversity
protection and, more generally, regulatory governance. But even if
the Services’ approach is understandable, its odds of success are
rather slim.19
No innovation in governance will make this dilemma
disappear.20 Consequently, while this Essay closes by suggesting
several modest reforms, its broader point will strike most readers
as a familiar lament. Notwithstanding the deregulatory fashions of
our present era, and the understandable desire of environmental
thinkers to find some less legalistic way to achieve positive
environmental change, a serious response to sea-level rise will
necessitate a genuine commitment to environmental regulation.
There is really no other choice.
In Part II, this Essay begins by describing the causes and
environmental consequences of sea-level rise. Part III then
explores the potential application of the ESA to sea-level rise, first
surveying the regulatory and non-regulatory tools set forth in the
statute, and then considering how they might be implemented. Part
IV turns from potential application to actual practices, describing
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking the Logjam
Project, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (criticizing traditional environmental
law as obsolescent); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 607, 627 (blaming “rigid, highly bureaucratized ‘command-and-control’
regulation” for “regulatory failure”).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. For articles offering creative solutions to the biodiversity threats posed
by climate change, see Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining
Nature and Natural Resources Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
171 (2010); Maschinski et al., supra note 12 (evaluating relocation of species as
an option). But as both articles acknowledge, the obstacles to successful species
relocations are likely to be substantial.
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what the Services have actually done to address sea-level rise. Part
V explores why there are significant differences between
theoretical possibilities and actual practices, and this Essay
concludes with suggestions for partial reform.
II. RISING SEAS AND CHANGING HABITATS
Sea levels are rising.21 The changes are incremental and
uneven; in some areas, land elevations are also rising, which slows
or negates the apparent change, and in others, land is subsiding,
thereby accelerating the impacts of rising seas.22 But across the
globe, average sea levels rose by approximately 1.7 millimeters per
year over the past century.23 Predictions of future sea-level rise
vary significantly and have substantial error ranges, though some
level of accelerated change is all but certain.24 Several recent
studies project as much as four feet of sea-level rise by the end of
the twenty-first century and continued change thereafter.25 If
substantial portions of the Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets melt,
the changes could be much more drastic.26

21. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 387 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007). See
also Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared to
Projections, 316 SCI. 709, 709 (2007) (“Since 1990 the observed sea level has
been rising faster than the rise projected by models . . . .”).
22. See Coastal Areas Impacts & Adaptation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/ coasts.html#impactssea
(last updated June 14, 2012).
23. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 320 (M.L. Parry et al. eds.,
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2chapter6.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Martin Vermeer & Stefan Rahmstorf, Global Sea Level Linked
to Global Temperature, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 21527, 21531 (2009)
(predicting changes three times higher than most recent projections of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
25. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing of the Miami
Blue Butterfly as Endangered Throughout Its Range; Listing of the Cassius
Blue, Ceraunus Blue, and Nickerbean Blue Butterflies as Threatened Due to
Similarity of Appearance to the Miami Blue Butterfly in Coastal South and
Central Florida, 77 Fed. Reg. 20948, 20970 (Apr. 6, 2012) (summarizing recent
studies).
26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23, at
317 (“Irreversible breakdown of the West Antarctica and/or Greenland ice
sheets, if triggered by rising temperatures, would make this long-term rise
significantly larger, ultimately questioning the viability of many coastal
settlements across the globe.”).
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The primary cause of these changes has long been clear.27 Sea
levels are rising because average global temperatures are rising,
and those rising temperatures cause liquid water to expand and ice
to melt.28 Global temperatures are rising largely because of human
emissions of greenhouse gases, which increase the capacity of the
atmosphere to retain energy radiated upward as heat.29 Those
greenhouse gas emissions derive from a wide variety of sources
and activities, with fossil fuel combustion contributing the lion’s
share.30 That fossil fuel combustion, in turn, supports electric
power generation, transportation, manufacturing, and domestic
heating across much of the world.31
Those rising seas threaten biodiversity in several ways. Many
coastal areas have gradual topography, and a slight rise in sea
levels can inundate many acres of land.32 Areas that were
previously subject to the ebb and flow of the tides will become
open water; dry sand beaches and coastal wetlands will be flooded;
inland freshwater wetlands, forests, or dune habitats will be
displaced by more salt-tolerant assemblages; and freshwater
streams and aquifers may turn brackish or saline.33 These habitat
shifts will be stressful for species even in undeveloped areas, but
where humans have built up the coastal zone, habitat zones cannot
migrate landward as sea levels rise. As a result, some habitats will
be lost.34 The problem is even more acute for areas with hardly any
topographic variation, like southern Florida or southern Louisiana.
There, habitat migrations would have to be exceedingly rapid to
27. See, e.g., James G. Titus, Sea Level Rise, in THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES: REPORT TO CONGRESS 118, 118–19
(1989) (describing the “greenhouse effect” as a cause of sea-level rise).
28. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 21,
at 408.
29. See id. at 133–36.
30. See id. at 136 (quantifying contributions from various sources).
31. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990–2010 (2012), available at
http://epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012Main-Text.pdf.
32. See, e.g., James G. Titus & Charlie Richman, Maps of Lands Vulnerable
to Sea Level Rise: Modeled Elevations along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts,
18 CLIMATE RES. 205, 217-23 (2001) (mapping vulnerable areas in Louisiana,
Florida, North Carolina, and the mid-Atlantic coast).
33. See Ann Shellenbarger Jones et al., Vulnerable Species: The Effects of
Sea-Level Rise on Costal Habitats, in U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE
PROGRAM, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MIDATLANTIC REGION 73–83 (2009) (describing habitat impacts).
34. See Noss, supra note 5, at 3 (“[H]uman development adjacent to the
coasts has destroyed suitable habitat and severed potential dispersal corridors to
inland areas that might otherwise accommodate range shifts.”).
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keep pace with rising seas.35 In some areas—the Florida
Everglades and Keys provide perhaps the starkest examples—there
may soon be nowhere that the habitat can go.36 And as habitat
goes, so, often, go the species.37
III. LEGAL OPTIONS
To all of this we have, in theory, a legislative response.
According to conventional wisdom, the ESA is one of the most
powerful environmental laws in the world.38 It combines
mandatory procedures with seemingly stringent regulatory
prohibitions, creating a formidable set of coercive sticks, and it
also empowers the Services to use a variety of incentive- and
information-based strategies. This Part addresses how all of these
tools might help the Services respond to sea-level rise.
A. Section 4
The ESA’s regulatory and nonregulatory protections begin
with section 4, which sets forth procedures for listing species as
threatened or endangered, designating critical habitat for those
species, and drafting recovery plans.39 Section 4 itself does not
provide any regulatory protection for species. Other than
authorizing recovery plans, which typically are not binding, it
simply provides procedures for making species eligible for
protection. But outside of a few narrow exceptions, a listing under

35. See id.; John C. Ogden et al., The Use of Conceptual Ecological Models
to Guide Ecosystem Restoration in South Florida, 25 WETLANDS 795, 801
(2005) (“Given that Florida is characterized by very small topographic relief, a
conservatively estimated sea-level rise of 0.75 m over the next century will
reduce shoreline habitat, overall habitat extent, and mix sediments and salinities
altering water composition.” (citation omitted)).
36. See generally THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, INITIAL ESTIMATES OF THE
ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE
FLORIDA KEYS THROUGH THE YEAR 2100 (2009) (mapping future scenarios for
the Florida Keys, some of which involve nearly complete inundation).
37. See David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in
the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 (1998) (identifying habitat loss as
the largest threat to threatened and endangered species).
38. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Indian Tribes, in 1 THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION
PROMISE 161, 170 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006) (describing the ESA as “the
strongest environmental law in the world”).
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).
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section 4 is a condition precedent to any other protection under the
Act.40
One might expect sea-level rise to affect section 4
implementation in several ways. First, the Services might consider
sea-level rise when making their listing decisions.41 Section 4 lists
several factors that the Services must take into account, including
“the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment
of [the species’] habitat or range.”42 That factor clearly
encompasses the effects of sea-level rise.43 Second, the Services
might adjust or expand their critical habitat designations to
encompass inland areas likely to become essential as sea levels
rise.44 The ESA defines critical habitat as habitat “essential to the
conservation of the species,” and if existing habitat will be
inundated, then the habitat that remains, or even habitat areas that
are not presently suitable for the species, may become essential.45
Finally, recovery plans could include a wide variety of provisions
designed to allow species to adjust to rising seas.46
B. Section 7
While section 4 establishes species’ eligibility for protection,
the actual protection comes from elsewhere in the statute, with
section 7 playing a central role.47 Section 7 prohibits federal
40. Unlisted species may be the beneficiaries, incidentally and sometimes
intentionally, of the protection of species listed under the Act, but sections 7 and
9 extend their direct protections only to species actually listed.
41. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act:
Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008)
(arguing that “[s]ection 4 leaves no room for debate over whether the agency
must integrate climate change effects in the listing decision”).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A).
43. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
44. See Ruhl, supra note 41, at 36 (“[T]he provision allowing designation of
specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species if ‘essential
for the conservation of the species’ may be an ideal way for FWS to respond
aggressively to ecological reshuffling.”).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2006). Not all essential areas are to be
included; the definition includes only those essential areas “which may require
special management considerations or protection.” Id. The definition also
expressly includes presently unoccupied habitat if it meets the “essential”
criterion. See id. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and
Boiling: Endangered Species Act Turning Down the Heat, 44 TULSA L. REV.
205, 222 (2008) (“[T]he section 7 consultation process is the heart of the
ESA.”).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006). Many commentators view section 7 as the
most influential portion of the ESA. However, in practice, implementation of
sections 7 and 9 is closely intertwined, and the influence of the two sections can
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agencies from taking actions likely to “jeopardize” the continued
existence of listed species or to “result in the destruction or adverse
modification” of designated critical habitat.48 Section 7 also creates
detailed procedural requirements for putting that substantive
mandate into effect. If their activities may affect listed species,
federal agencies are obligated to “consult” with one of the
Services, depending on which agency holds jurisdiction over the
affected species. The Services must provide either a concurrence
that the proposed project’s effects will not be adverse or, if some
adverse effect is possible, a “biological opinion” assessing whether
the project is likely to cause jeopardy or adverse modification and
prescribing adjustments to reduce or eliminate the adverse
impacts.49 This consultation process rarely halts projects, but every
year it leads to thousands of environmentally protective project
changes.50
As with section 4, the Services might use section 7 to respond
to sea-level rise in several ways. First, and perhaps most
ambitiously, the Services might use the section 7 process to
address the root causes of climate change.51 Thus, when federal
agencies consider actions that will accelerate greenhouse gas
emissions or eliminate greenhouse gas sinks,52 the Services might
require consultation. Through those consultation processes, the
Services might negotiate or impose conditions designed to avoid or
mitigate emissions.53
Even if the Services do not take that step, they might invoke
sea-level rise as a reason to ratchet up their efforts to address other

be difficult to separate. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of
Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 187 & n.292 (2012) (explaining
how section 7 consultations almost invariably lead to restrictions designed to
avoid “takes” of listed species).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(a)(1), which requires all federal
agencies to take steps to conserve listed species, has proven less influential in
practice, and I do not discuss its importance here.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b), (c) (setting forth the consultation requirements).
50. See Owen, supra note 47, at 163–64.
51. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 207 (“The regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions under the ESA through the Section 7 consultation process is
legally required and of great practical importance.”). But see Ruhl, supra note
41, at 46–47 (arguing that the consultation process applies poorly to greenhouse
gas sources).
52. A greenhouse gas sink is a landscape feature, like a growing forest, that
removes greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
53. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 223–29.
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threats.54 For example, if a species is likely to be threatened by
saltwater intrusion, the Services might seek more stringent controls
on upstream water withdrawals and pollutant discharges.55 The
gravity of those other threats may increase as sea-level rise adds a
new stressor, creating a likelihood of jeopardy or adverse
modification even if the same activities would pose less of a threat
in a world without climate change.56 Consequently, the Services
might reach more jeopardy or adverse modification findings, or
they might use the section 7 process to impose more protective
conditions in an effort to increase species’ capacity to survive
despite rising seas.
C. Section 9 (and Sections 7 and 10)
The ESA’s other major substantive constraint comes from
section 9, which prohibits anyone from “taking” endangered
species.57 That prohibition appears far-reaching, particularly
because the Services interpret the prohibition to include some
modifications to habitat.58 Nevertheless, exceptions to the
prohibition do exist. “Incidental” takes are allowed pursuant to
approved “incidental take statements,” which the Services issue
through the section 7 consultation process, and pursuant to “habitat
conservation plans,” which are governed by ESA section 10.59
54. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 43–45 (2010) (emphasizing the reduction of nonclimate
stressors as a central priority for environmental protection in an era of climate
change).
55. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing
Determinations for Two Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon
(Acipenser oxyrinchus oxyrinchus) in the Southeast, 77 Fed. Reg. 5914, 5972
(Feb. 6, 2012) (discussing the relationship between saltwater intrusion and other
habitat stressors).
56. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322,
367–69 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting as illegal a biological opinion that failed to
consider whether climate change would exacerbate other strains upon the
species); Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 223 (“[A] finding that allowing the
destruction of certain coastal wetlands relied upon by a listed species will not
equate to jeopardy because sufficient other wetlands still exist in a nearby
preserve utterly fails to protect the species if the preserve will no longer exist in
50 years following another half-meter or more of sea level rise.”).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
58. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (upholding this interpretation).
59. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2006); id. § 1539(a); J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill
Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act
“HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999).
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Both incidental take statements and habitat conservation plans
require compliance with conditions designed to minimize the
impact of the take, and habitat conservation plans can also include
measures to compensate for takes.60
Like the jeopardy and adverse modification prohibitions, the
take prohibition might address sea-level rise in two primary ways.
First, a few commentators and activists have argued that at least
some actions that emit greenhouse gases, and thus contribute to
habitat modifications, are causing prohibited takes and should
therefore face liability under section 9.61 Second, sea-level rise
might provide a basis for finding that other incursions upon habitat
or threats to species constitute a “take.” For example, amid stable
sea levels, a beach-armoring program that degrades some habitat
might not create a take because animals may be able to avoid the
project area without incurring any harm. But if sea-level rise has
left those animals with nowhere else to go, the same activity might
be subject to section 9 liability.
D. Non-Regulatory Tools
When lawyers and politicians talk about the ESA, they tend to
characterize it as a regulatory “pit bull,” a source of rigid and
unyielding prohibitions.62 But actual implementation of section 7
and section 9 involves far fewer commands (let alone enforcement
actions) and much more negotiation than the “pit bull”
characterization would suggest.63 The Services also have a variety
of nonregulatory tools, many of which they could employ to
address sea-level rise. They can draft recovery plans, which can
provide blueprints for species conservation.64 They can use federal

60. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii); id. § 1539(a) (requiring applicants to
“minimize and mitigate” impacts).
61. See, e.g., Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 230–31. But see Ruhl, supra
note 41, at 40–42 (concluding that plaintiffs could not show that a specific
emissions source was the proximate cause of a take); Owen, supra note 47, at
160 (drawing a similar conclusion).
62. See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School: The
Endangered Species Act at 25: What Works?, 15 ENVTL. F. 55, 55 (1998).
63. See Owen, supra note 47, at 182–85.
64. See Anthony Povilitis & Kierán Suckling, Addressing Climate Change
Threats to Endangered Species in U.S. Recovery Plans, 24 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 372, 372 (2010) (“Recovery plans are the central organizing tool for
guiding species restoration under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.”). Legal
authors have generally been less sanguine in their estimation of the value of
recovery plans, at least as they have traditionally been drafted. See, e.g.,
Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the
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money to purchase habitat.65 They can manage areas that they
already control, like wildlife refuges, to promote resilience in the
face of rising seas, perhaps by restoring or creating habitat to
compensate for likely losses elsewhere.66 They can promote
scientific research on the threats posed by sea-level rise and the
ways that species might respond. Using that knowledge, they can
participate, as informational resources and as advocates rather than
as regulators, in state, local, and private decision-making
processes.67 And finally, they can try to educate the general public
about the impacts of sea-level rise.68 None of these options figures
centrally in the average legal casebook’s coverage of the ESA, but
all are prominent in the Services’ portfolio of tools.
IV. ACTUAL RESPONSES
So, what are the Services actually doing? The answer is not
easy to discern. While the Services produce thousands of
documents every year, most are not published to the Internet.69 Nor
do the Services produce summary statistics explaining how, if at
all, their implementation approaches are evolving or changing.
ESA implementation can therefore seem like a black box, and
exposing that box’s inner workings would require issuing dozens
of Freedom of Information Act requests, reviewing hundreds—

Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 16 & n.64 (1996) (arguing that
recovery plans were often vague and usually unenforceable).
65. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FY 2011 COOPERATIVE
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION FUND PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
ARRANGED BY STATE (2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/
grants/Sect%206%20FY2011%20Combined%20Award%20Summaries%20Fina
l%208-22.pdf.
66. See, e.g., Working with Nature to Prepare for the Change, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/stories/alligatorriver.html
(last updated Sept. 28, 2010) (describing efforts to promote habitat resiliency at
the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in North Carolina) [hereinafter
Working with Nature].
67. For example, in a recent research project focused on state water
allocation decisions, I discovered that the Services often submitted comments on
water right applications. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, The Public
Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1118
(2012).
68. See, e.g., There’s Nothing Level About Sea Level, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/profiles/caperomain.html (last
updated Mar. 2, 2011) (educational video) [hereinafter There’s Nothing Level].
69. Listing decisions and critical habitat-designation documents are
published in the Federal Register. Biological opinions and habitat conservation
plans are not, however, and many are not published anywhere on the Internet.
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perhaps thousands—of documents, and interviewing many agency
staff.70 For this Essay, I did not take those ambitious steps. My
research instead was limited to court cases, Federal Register
filings, agency guidance documents and policy statements, and
agency websites.
Nevertheless, even that limited set of sources supports some
intriguing, albeit tentative, conclusions about how the Services are
using the ESA to respond to sea-level rise. The central conclusion
is that the Services are committed to responding to sea-level rise,
but only by using a subset of the available tools. Their marked
preference has been to use their educational powers and persuasive
authority rather than any sort of regulatory stick.
A. Section 4 Implementation: Species Listing and Critical Habitat
The most extensive paper trail documenting the Services’
responses to sea-level rise comes from implementation of ESA
section 4.71 The Services’ proposed and final decisions to list
species as threatened or endangered, to remove them from the lists,
and to designate or change critical habitat all are published in the
Federal Register, as are status reports on unresolved listing
petitions. Consequently, an extensive written record documents
what the Services are doing to implement section 4 and why.
That record leaves no doubt that the Services now consider sealevel rise to be a threat. For a few species, the Services have
referred to sea-level rise as a primary reason for a threatened or
endangered listing.72 For many others, they have identified it as a
contributing threat, both in listing documents and in reviews of the
status of species that remain candidates for listing.73 Whether the
70. For an example of this approach, see Owen, supra note 47, at 161–63.
Even with this more exhaustive methodology, some questions about the efficacy
of regulatory approaches remained very difficult, if not impossible, to answer.
71. That evidence is clear partly because listing documents are readily
accessible.
72. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing of the
Miami Blue Butterfly as Endangered Throughout Its Range; Listing of the
Cassius Blue, Ceraunus Blue, and Nickerbean Blue Butterflies as Threatened
Due to Similarity of Appearance to the Miami Blue Butterfly in Coastal South
and Central Florida, 77 Fed. Reg. 20948, 20969–70 (Apr. 6, 2012) (“Climatic
changes, including sea level rise, are major threats to south Florida, including
the Miami blue and its habitat.”).
73. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing
Determinations for Two Distinct Population Segments of Atlantic Sturgeon
(Acipenser oxyrinchus oxyrinchus) in the Southeast, 77 Fed. Reg. 5914, 5972
(Feb. 6, 2012) (noting that sea-level rise will stress water supplies, leading to
potential reductions in freshwater flows and thus impairing water quality);
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Services are giving enough emphasis to sea-level rise is a scientific
question beyond the scope of this Essay, but they are clearly
treating it as a relevant factor. In that way, at least, sea-level rise
has changed implementation of the ESA.
Nevertheless, sea-level rise has not affected section 4
implementation quite as much as one might expect. Initially,
whatever effects are occurring are only of recent vintage. Through
the end of 2011, the Services had actually discussed sea-level rise
in 46 listing-related documents.74 All but one of those documents
date from 2005 or later, and 27 of them—almost 60%—are from
2010 and 2011 alone.75 Scientists have understood for decades that
the climate is changing and that those changes would accelerate
sea-level rise, but only in the last few years have the Services’
listing decisions begun to grapple with that reality.76
Additionally, the evidence of changed approaches is almost
entirely limited to species listings rather than critical habitat
designations. One might expect the Services to designate as critical
habitat areas that are presently not highly suitable, or perhaps not
even occupied, to allow species and their habitats to migrate inland

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native Species That
Are Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual Notice of
Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual Description of Progress on Listing
Actions, 76 Fed. Reg. 66370, 66372, 66412, 66413, 66415, 66417 (Oct. 26,
2011) (identifying sea-level rise as a threat to multiple plant species);
Endangered and Threatened Species; Determination of Nine Distinct Population
Segments of Loggerhead Sea Turtles as Endangered or Threatened, 76 Fed. Reg.
58868, 58892, 58909, 58917 (Sept. 22, 2011) (discussing sea-level rise as a
significant contributing threat). But see Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition To List the Black-footed Albatross as
Endangered or Threatened, 76 Fed. Reg. 62504, 62520–23 (Oct. 7, 2011)
(identifying sea-level rise as a threat but not a substantial enough threat to justify
listing).
74. I base these numbers on the results of an electronic search for FWS or
NMFS Federal Register documents containing the phrase “sea-level rise.” From
that overall pool, I eliminated documents that did not pertain to section 4
implementation (for example, filings pertaining to management of national
wildlife refuges). The resulting numbers do contain some imprecision; the
difference between actually discussing sea-level rise and merely mentioning it—
for example, in a paper title, or in a boilerplate summary of climate change
impacts—is obviously fuzzy, and another researcher might come to slightly
different numbers. Nevertheless, the differences would be subtle. There are only
a few additional documents that use the phrase “sea-level rise” without
providing what I would describe as discussion.
75. A summary table is on file with the author and with the Louisiana Law
Review and is available on request.
76. See Titus, supra note 27 (describing sea-level rise as a consequence of
climate change; report chapter was written in 1989).
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as sea levels change.77 That approach would fit with the letter and
spirit of the law;78 in an era of shifting habitats, presently
unoccupied areas may become essential if the species is to be
conserved. Indeed, the Services themselves, along with many
commentators, have endorsed that sort of anticipatory protection.79
But to date, the Services have only once turned that rhetorical
endorsement into reality. I found one critical habitat designation
that encompassed areas likely to be needed as sea levels rise, as
well as two earlier filings describing and inviting comments on that
proposed approach.80 Two other documents emphasized the
designation of presently-occupied habitat areas less vulnerable to
sea-level rise, though in both cases that habitat might have been
designated anyway (the documents are not clear on this point).81 In
a larger—albeit still small—number of documents, the Services
77. See Ruhl, supra note 41, at 36 (explaining this potential approach).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2006) (“It is further declared to be the
policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”).
79. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY,
PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT 3 (2012), available at http://www.wildlifeadaptation
strategy.gov/pdf/public_review_draft.pdf (noting that because “[m]any wildlife
refuges and habitats could lose some of their original values . . . there’s a growing
need to identify the best candidates for new conservation areas . . . .”); see also id.
at 54–55 (emphasizing the importance of protecting an ample amount of habitat
and of protecting habitat corridors).
80. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of
Critical Habitat for the Pacific Coast Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 77
Fed. Reg. 36728, 36731, 36735 (June 19, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)
(discussing this approach); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Designation of Critical Habitat and Taxonomic Revision for the Pacific Coast
Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 77 Fed. Reg. 2243, 2243 (proposed Jan.
17, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“We are particularly interested in
comments concerning . . . [s]pecific information on our proposed revised
designation of back-dune systems and other habitats in an attempt to offset the
anticipated effects of sea-level rise associated with climate change.”); Endangered
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Critical Habitat for the Pacific Coast
Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 76 Fed. Reg. 16046, 16049–50
(proposed Mar. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
81. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Proposed
Rulemaking to Revise Critical Habitat for Hawaiian Monk Seals, 76 Fed. Reg.
32026, 32036, 32041–42 (proposed June 2, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
226) (acknowledging sea-level rise as a threat, noting that the critical habitat
designation includes areas less vulnerable to sea-level rise, and declining to
designate unoccupied habitat); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Louisiana Black Bear (Ursus americanus
luteolus), 74 Fed. Reg. 10350, 10356–57 (Mar. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (emphasizing that the designated area includes upland habitat that
will remain viable as sea levels rise).
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identified sea-level rise as a threat but declined to adjust the critical
habitat boundary, usually citing uncertainty about where suitable
habitat would eventually emerge.82 Consequently, for almost every
species affected by sea-level rise, critical habitat designations are
unchanged.
B. Section 7 Implementation: Jeopardy and Adverse Modification
The theme of reticent implementation continues with section 7.
In theory, the Services might use section 7 to address the root
causes of sea-level rise, or, alternatively or additionally, to increase
species’ resilience in the face of sea-level rise by reducing other
threats.83 In practice, however, they have emphatically disavowed
the former course of action, and there is little, if any, evidence that
they are pursuing the latter.
Beginning in 2007, when the listing of the polar bear first
compelled the Services to confront the issue, the Services clearly
and repeatedly stated that they saw no role for section 7 in
82. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of
Revised Critical Habitat for the Tidewater Goby, 76 Fed. Reg. 64996, 65001
(proposed Oct. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“[T]he information
currently available on the effects of global climate change is not sufficiently
precise to determine what additional areas, if any, may be appropriate to include
in the revised critical habitat for this species to address the effects of climate
change.”); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Wintering Population of the Piping
Plover (Charadrius melodus) in Texas, 74 Fed. Reg. 23476, 23480–81 (May 19,
2009) (“However, the information currently available on the effects of climate
change does not make sufficiently accurate estimates of the location and
magnitude of the effects, so we are unable to determine what additional areas
would be needed, nor where they would be located.”); Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the
Tidewater Goby (Eucyclogobius newberryi), 73 Fed. Reg. 5920, 5926 (Jan. 31,
2008) (“We simply do not have good science at this point that provides local
predictions. Therefore, we cannot account for such potential but unknown
changes in local climate in our critical habitat designation.”); Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for Cirsium
hydrophilum var. hydrophilum (Suisun thistle) and Cordylanthus mollis ssp.
mollis (soft bird’s-beak), 72 Fed. Reg. 18518, 18519 (Apr. 12, 2007)
(responding to a peer reviewer’s comment urging designation of presently
unoccupied areas: “Given the speculative nature of such an undertaking, we do
not consider the available evidence sufficient to support a finding that any
particular unoccupied upland area is essential to the conservation of the
subspecies.”).
83. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 222–30 (arguing that section 7
should apply to greenhouse gas sources); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 367–70 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting a
biological opinion that failed to account for climate change’s potential to
exacerbate other stresses).
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regulating the root causes of climate change.84 As one internal
memorandum put it, “[W]here the effect at issue is climate change
in the form of increased temperatures, a proposed action that
involves the emission of [greenhouse gases] cannot pass the ‘may
affect’ test and is not subject to consultation under the ESA and its
implementing regulations.”85 At least in the Services’ view, that
guidance still appears to be the law of the land. For another recent
research project, I and my research assistant reviewed several
thousand biological opinions, finding not a single consultation
triggered by, or even addressing, a federal action’s greenhouse gas
emissions.86 I am not aware of any evidence, either in the form of
individual biological opinions or overarching agency guidance, of
a subsequent change in practices.
The evidence is more equivocal about whether the Services are
attempting to use section 7 to support climate change adaptation.87
If they are, the most likely changes would be adjustments in the
type or extent of the protective measures the Services negotiate
through the consultation process.88 Documenting whether such
changes exist is difficult, even if one does have all the relevant
biological opinions—and I do not. With only a cold, paper record,
one cannot easily judge how protective the various protective
measures are, let alone compare those conditions to the conditions
imposed before sea-level rise emerged as a threat.89 Consequently,
I cannot say with certainty whether the Services are using this
approach. Nevertheless, if change has occurred, it has been fairly
well-hidden. The Services have not published any sort of guidance
directing their regional and field offices to adjust section 7
84. See Lawrence Liebesman et al., The Endangered Species Act and
Climate Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11173, 11179 (2009)
(quoting multiple FWS documents).
85. Memorandum from Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dept. of Interior, to
Director, U.S. Dept. of Interior, 7 (Oct. 3, 2008) (citation omitted), available at
http://www.peer.org/docs/doi/08_14_10_interior_solicitor_memo.pdf.
86. See Owen, supra note 47, at 169.
87. There is no question about whether the Services are using section 7 to
respond to other threats to species. Clearly, they are. See id. at 171–72, 187–88.
The question instead is whether sea-level rise, or, more generally, climate
change, has generated any adjustments in ways the Services address those other
threats.
88. As discussed above, section 7 consultations rarely block projects and
usually instead lead to conditional approvals. See id. at 163–64 (summarizing
past studies and providing recent statistics).
89. See id. at 171–72 (discussing the types of controls the Services
sometimes impose and the challenge of assessing their efficacy). Of course,
even if such a comparison did demonstrate that a change had occurred, the
change might be due to some other variable rather than to concerns about sealevel rise.
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implementation to promote climate change adaptation. And while
their broader strategy documents argue that “[r]educing existing
stresses on fish, wildlife, and plants can be some of the most
effective, and doable, ways to increase resilience to climate
change,” those documents say nothing about using the consultation
process as a means to that end.90 In short, while I cannot say that
the Services are not adjusting their approaches to section 7 in an
effort to promote resilience in the face of sea level rise, I have
found no evidence that they are doing so.
C. Section 9
The story of section 9 implementation is quite similar to that of
section 7. Initially, the evidence of the Services’ activities is
difficult to obtain. Most section 9 implementation occurs not
through direct enforcement of the take provision—such
enforcement rarely happens—but instead through incidental take
statements and habitat conservation plans, neither of which are
generally available online.91 Discerning changes in section 9
implementation therefore would require reviewing many HCPs and
biological opinions, neither of which I have gathered, as well as
conducting more interviews. But even a more limited review
suggests that section 9 is exerting limited influence. As with
section 7, the Services have clearly disclaimed any intent to use
section 9 to mitigate the causes of climate change.92 And they have
not issued any regulations, amendments to their HCP handbook, or
other guidance or memoranda directing agencies to otherwise
90. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION
STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 4; id. at 57 (describing strategies for habitat
conservation but not mentioning the adverse modification or jeopardy
prohibitions or the consultation process).
91. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case
Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 315 (1997) (noting that
direct enforcement of section 9 is rare); Owen, supra note 47, at 187 (noting that
section 9 plays an important role in consultation processes).
92. See News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Salazar Retains
Conservation Rule for Polar Bears Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy
and Climate Change Legislation (May 8, 2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/
news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-04788E08
92D91701. The news release announced that the Obama Administration would
retain a Bush Administration rule that precluded any section 9 liability for
greenhouse gas emissions affecting polar bears. Interior Secretary Salazar was
quoted as saying, “[T]he Endangered Species Act is not the proper mechanism for
controlling our nation’s carbon emissions. Instead, we need a comprehensive
energy and climate strategy that curbs climate change and its impacts—including
the loss of sea ice.” Id.
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change their approaches to section 9 implementation to account for
sea-level rise.93
D. Nonregulatory Tools
While the Services have been reluctant to exercise their
regulatory authority, they have not been inactive in responding to
sea-level rise. The Services’ websites describe widespread efforts
to educate the public about realities of sea-level rise and the
biodiversity threats that it poses.94 In national wildlife refuges,
where the Services already control land, they are planning for
adaptation, working on habitat restoration projects designed to
increase resilience in the face of sea-level rise, and, in some places,
experimenting with carbon sequestration.95 They also are
developing planning tools that state and local governments and
private land managers could use to address sea-level rise. For
example, FWS recently released its Sea Level Rise Affecting
Marshes Model (“SLAMM”), a web-based tool that allows users to
created simulated maps illustrating the effects of sea-level rise.96
Ideally, the model should help local governments as they try to
keep development away from areas that will likely flood, with the
collateral benefit of protecting habitat in those same areas.97
Finally, the Services continue to spend grant money on habitat
preservation, and they direct some of that money to areas at risk
from sea-level rise.98
That selective emphasis on education, facilitation, and
nonregulatory advocacy appears to reflect a deliberate strategy. In
January 2012, the Services published a draft report outlining their

93. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT
PROCESSING HANDBOOK (1996), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
pdfs/laws/hcp_handbook.pdf. The handbook does not specifically discuss
climate change mitigation or adaptation.
94. See, e.g., There’s Nothing Level, supra note 68.
95. See, e.g., id.; Working with Nature, supra note 66 (describing efforts to
promote habitat resiliency at the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in
North Carolina); Stacy Shelton, Opportunities to Sequester Carbon by Restoring
North Carolina's Pocosins, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/
southeast/climate/stories/pocosinlakes.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2010)
(describing a habitat restoration and carbon sequestration project).
96. Sea Level Rise Affecting Marshes Model, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/slamm/ (last updated Apr. 23, 2012).
97. For a discussion of how some state and local governments are actually
reacting to sea-level rise, see infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 65.
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strategy for climate change adaptation.99 The report contains
several case studies of the impacts of sea-level rise and leaves no
doubt that the Services consider climate change generally, and sealevel rise more specifically, as major challenges that they must
address.100 To respond, the Services offer a menu of options.
“[C]ollaborat[ing] among all levels of government,” “supporting
adaptive management,” “increasing knowledge,” and “increasing
awareness and motivating action” are a few representative
examples.101 Some of the goals seem broad enough to encompass
regulatory approaches, but the strategy provides no blueprint for
turning any of these concepts into specific regulatory constraints.
Instead, the Services assert that a central principle of climate
adaptation will be to “foster communication and collaboration”
rather than prescription.102 The vision seems to be of the Services
as educators and (unpaid) consultants, providing information and
analytical tools, facilitating partnerships, and spending a little bit
of money, but leaving the thankless work of regulating, if any such
work is to be done, to someone else.
V. EXPLAINING THE RELUCTANCE
The Services’ reluctance to invoke their regulatory powers to
address sea-level rise, or climate change more generally, may
initially surprise some readers. Why, we might ask, wouldn’t the
agencies responsible for implementing our most important statute
for protecting biodiversity use that statute to address what is
emerging as an enormous threat to biodiversity?103 As Part III
99. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION
STRATEGY, supra note 79. According to the website associated with the report,
the FWS, NOAA, and the New York Division of Fish, Wildlife, and Marine
Resources chaired the report-writing effort with input from many other entities.
See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service & Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
About Us, NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY,
http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/about.php (last visited Sept. 14,
2012). As of this writing, the report remains in draft form.
100. See NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION
STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 7 (identifying sea-level rise as an important effect
of climate change), 44 (discussing impacts to piping plovers and agency
responses), 57–58 (describing habitat impacts on New Jersey’s Cape May
Peninsula), 62 (describing impacts to coastal Delaware), 67–68 (describing
threats and response efforts at Elkhorn Slough in California).
101. Id. at 3, 5.
102. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
Goals, NAT’L FISH, WILDLIFE & PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY,
http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/goals.php (last visited June 6, 2012).
103. See Celine Bellard et al., Impacts of Climate Change on the Future of
Biodiversity, 15 ECOLOGY LETTERS 365, 375 (2012) (reviewing the literature on
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shows, the problem is not a lack of potential legal tools; if the
Services were to pursue aggressive regulatory approaches, they
could invoke multiple statutory provisions as authority.104
Nevertheless, the Services have legal, practical, and political
reasons for their reticence. And while those reasons are most
salient with respect to climate change mitigation, the challenges of
using the ESA as a tool for climate change adaptation are also
substantial. To make matters even more difficult, the challenges of
mitigation and adaptation—even voluntary, nonregulatory
approaches to adaptation—are intertwined.
A. Designating Critical Habitat
The evidence of reticence begins with the Services’ reluctance
to designate critical habitat that is not presently occupied, but that
could become essential as sea levels rise. As Part IV discusses,
external commentators have endorsed this practice, and the
Services have acknowledged the importance of anticipatory habitat
designations. However, they have done almost nothing to put this
practice into effect.105
There are several reasons for the Services’ reluctance. First, the
Services are correct that predicting where suitable habitat will
emerge involves uncertainty. Even if scientists can readily predict
sea-level rise, the habitat dynamics triggered by that rise are
substantially more complex.106 The second set of reasons is
practical and political rather than scientific. Critical habitat

climate change and biodiversity and concluding that most models “indicate
alarming consequences for biodiversity with worst-case scenarios leading to
extinction rates that would qualify as the sixth mass extinction in the history of
the earth” (citation omitted)). The authors also note that modeled predictions of
climate change’s impacts on biodiversity vary widely and that such modeling is
relatively new, with many unresolved methodological problems.
104. See discussion supra Part III.
105. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
106. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23,
at 320 (“Climate change and sea-level rise affect sediment transport [which in
turn controls the configuration of many coastal habitats] in complex ways and
abrupt, non-linear changes may occur as thresholds are crossed.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)); Donald R. Cahoon et al., Vulnerable Species: The
Effects of Sea-Level Rise on Costal Habitats, in U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE
PROGRAM, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MIDATLANTIC REGION 9 (2009) (“Making long-term projections of coastal change is
difficult because of the multiple, interacting factors that contribute to that
change.”).
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designations are already one of the Services’ greatest headaches.107
Many designations are triggered by and then provoke litigation,
and the Services have sometimes been rather skeptical of the
protective value of those designations once they are completed.108
Under such circumstances, a reluctance to expand the scope of
designations is understandable.
Nevertheless, if anticipatory critical habitat designations could
protect species to even a limited extent—and prior research
demonstrates, notwithstanding the Services’ occasional
protestations to the contrary, that they could—this reluctance
hamstrings the Services’ efforts to protect species.109 A critical
habitat designation provides one of the few ways, other than
simply purchasing property interests, that the Services could
provide some preemptive regulatory protection for habitat that
species might eventually need.110 That protection would not be
absolute, for section 7 provides no direct protection against
nonfederal alteration of critical habitat.111 But designations would
at least warn landowners of potential future species needs,
providing a signal that development of designated areas could
create regulatory complexities and should therefore be avoided.112
107. See Owen, supra note 47, at 144–45.
108. See The Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005:
Hearing on H.R. 3824 Before the H. Comm. on Res., 109th Cong. 28 (2005)
(statement of Craig Manson, Assistant Sec’y of Dep’t of Interior).
109. See Owen, supra note 47, at 180–81 (describing ways critical habitat
designations may influence landowners’ and land managers’ practices and
concluding that the influence on regulators’ decision-making, while minor, is
real); Kieran Suckling & Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in 1 THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION
PROMISE, supra note 38, at 75, 80–85 (providing case studies of critical habitat
designations leading to species protection).
110. In theory, the loss of such habitat could also jeopardize species’
survival, but showing that the habitat will be adversely modified is often easier
than supporting a jeopardy determination. See Owen, supra note 47, at 155–56.
111. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (applying only to federal agency
actions).
112. There is some risk that critical habitat designations could also spur
landowners to alter their land and make sure that species do not take up
residence there. See generally Jonathan Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse
Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 301, 303–04 (2008). That risk would seem particularly acute where the
habitat alteration requires no federal funding or authorization because section
7’s prohibition on adverse modification then would not apply. However, there is
also evidence that even private landowners will try to avoid activities on land
designated as critical habitat and that designations may spur local or private land
conservation efforts. See Jeffrey E. Zabel & Robert W. Paterson, The Effects of
Critical Habitat Designation on Housing Supply: An Analysis of California
Housing Construction Activity, 46 J. REGIONAL SCI. 67, 90 (2006); Owen, supra
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Conversely, in the absence of anticipatory designations, areas that
might become suitable for future use by species may instead be
more likely to be developed. By the time the Services realize that
an expanded critical habitat designation would be appropriate,
there may be no suitable places left to designate.
B. Mitigation
There are also obvious and understandable reasons for the
Services’ reluctance to invoke the regulatory controls in sections 7
and 9.113 In part, the challenges are scientific and legal.
Demonstrating that the greenhouse gas emissions from a single
federal project are solely responsible for jeopardizing a listed
species—let alone causing take of individual animals—would be
impossible because any individual project’s emissions will blend
with those of millions of other human activities.114 Stating that an
individual project is adversely modifying critical habitat should be
easier because a new set of greenhouse gas emissions will clearly
cause changes, and even if those changes are unquantifiable and
highly incremental, they are adverse.115 But the Services’ standard
practice is to treat small-habitat modifications as exempt from the
adverse modification prohibition, and so long as that standard
practice persists, almost any contribution to climate change is
likely to escape coverage.116
Those legal challenges are closely related to several practical
obstacles. If the Services were to use section 7 in an attempt to
mitigate the causes of sea-level rise, theoretically they could use a

note 47, at 180–81. Which of these reactions predominates is an empirical
question to which existing studies have not provided a thorough answer, and
reactions may also evolve as land managers become more sophisticated in their
understanding of critical habitat designations.
113. For detailed discussion of these challenges, see Ruhl, supra note 41, at
39–49.
114. See Ruhl, supra note 41, at 46–47. The Services could reach jeopardy
findings by reasoning that an individual project contributes to the cumulative
impact of climate change, and that cumulative impact is jeopardizing a species’
likelihood of survival. That approach would be analogous to the approach
required by the Council on Environmental Quality’s implementing regulations
for the National Environmental Policy Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7)
(2009). However, the Services generally have not adopted that approach.
115. See Owen, supra note 47, at 155–56 (explaining this argument); see also
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994)
(“Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to
change moderately or in minor fashion.”).
116. See id. at 168–70.
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few different approaches. One would be to focus on a few major
greenhouse gas-emitting federal projects and find that those
projects are causing jeopardy, adverse modification, or take.117 If
the Services do that, however, they would have to explain why
those projects are subject to regulatory constraint while smaller
projects are exempt.118 Because all greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to the same overall problem, that distinction could be
difficult to justify.119 Alternatively, the Services could attempt to
regulate all federal greenhouse gas-emitting projects, but that
would lead to an extraordinary increase in their already
overwhelming workloads, to say nothing of the costs imposed on
action agencies and other regulated entities.120 In theory, the
Services might achieve some administrative efficiency by asking
action agencies to include standard mitigation measures as part of
their project descriptions.121 For example, they might ask action
agencies or project proponents to purchase carbon offsets to
compensate for project emissions, and then they might invoke
those offsets as the basis for finding compliance with ESA section
7’s jeopardy and adverse modification prohibitions.122 But that
approach would also put the Services in a difficult position, for it
would compel them to become the organizers and overseers of a
117. See Moritz et al., supra note 46, at 224 (“While some federal actions
may not contribute appreciable amounts of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere,
many clearly do so.”).
118. That challenge is not unique to ESA implementation. See, e.g.,
Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into
Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 62–63,
67, 85 (2009) (discussing the challenges associated with deciding what level of
GHG emissions counts as “significant”).
119. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2,
5, 15–16 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (explaining that most greenhouse
gases are long-lasting and well-mixed, which means that emissions from all over
the world contribute to the aggregate global problem).
120. See Owen, supra note 47, at 190 (quoting a service biologist who said
agency staff were “barely keeping our heads above water” with their existing
workload).
121. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(e)(1) (2006) (establishing ratios for ozone
emission offsets).
122. For this approach to be legally viable, the Services would need to
consider the offset to be part of the “action” under consultation. The approach
might also be limited by laws and regulations constraining the spending
practices of action agencies, which might not be able to contribute to offset
programs without additional legal authorization. Nevertheless, even if the
approach seems legally conceivable, at least for some activities potentially
subject to section 7, the practical and political impediments would be
substantial.
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massive carbon offsets market. That task is much closer to the
traditional competence of EPA, which has years of experience
regulating air quality, than of agencies traditionally tasked with
protecting wildlife.123
And, of course, looming behind all of these legal and practical
difficulties are the politics. The challenges of environmental
regulation, though never small, have grown more intense in the
current political climate. EPA’s incremental efforts to respond to
climate change illustrate those challenges, for they have turned the
agency into a constant target of political vitriol.124 The venom that
the Services would face if they turned the ESA—a political
lightning rod even before climate change emerged as an issue—
into the cutting edge of climate change regulation would likely be
even worse. That reaction might well lead to funding limitations
that undermine the Services’ work or even to statutory
amendments undercutting or entirely removing their authority.125
Even if that backlash does not occur, the best results that the
Services could hope for would be to constrain a subset of the
United States’ future emissions, which in turn represent just a
fraction of the emissions contributing to the global problem, and to
provide a model regulatory program capable of being imitated
elsewhere.126 Such “whittl[ing] away” may be the only realistic
way to address climate change, but the Services’ reluctance to
wade into a firestorm, all in pursuit of a partial solution, is
certainly still understandable.127
123. Even for EPA, which has experience administering air pollutantemissions trading systems, administering a major carbon offset program would
likely be a challenging task. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement
Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 ENVTL. L. 1195, 1196–1202 (2010)
(describing some of the challenges of overseeing carbon emissions trading
programs).
124. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P.
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/18/us/politics/18epa.html. The rhetoric is not limited to the political
branches. See, e.g., Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006,
1039–41 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J. dissenting) (blasting a series of allegedly
“extreme environmental decisions” issued by the Ninth Circuit).
125. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental
Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1611, 1628, 1630 (2008) (describing political
controversies that led to Congressional budgetary restrictions on ESA
implementation).
126. See Global Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012)
(showing the United States’ share of global emissions).
127. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (“Agencies, like
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory
swoop. They instead whittle away at them over time . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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C. Adaptation
None of my observations about the challenges of using the
ESA to mitigate sea-level rise is particularly new. The common
response has been to argue that the Services should focus their
efforts on climate adaptation, where the ESA arguably has more
potential to do good.128 That argument is sensible, but the Services’
record suggests that promoting sea-level rise adaptation is also a
difficult thing to do.129
In part, the challenge arises from the inherent difficulties with
regulating activities in the coastal zone, where land is widely
coveted and development pressures tend to be intense.130 But the
challenge also arises from the Services’ understandable desire to
decouple climate change mitigation and adaptation. That
decoupling creates an obvious fairness problem any time the
Services seek to ratchet up controls on other activities in the
coastal zone. So long as that regulation occurs without any
corresponding attempt to control emissions, the affected agencies
or landowners (or local governments that are encouraged to
intensify their land use controls) quite reasonably can ask, “Why
us? How can you increase our burden while you’re letting the real
cause of the problem off scot-free?” “Because you’re the more
accessible target” is not likely to be a satisfying answer.
Because of these obstacles, we should not be surprised that the
Services prefer to invoke their nonregulatory tools to respond to
sea-level rise. But here, as well, the absence of a regulatory
program—and, particularly, the absence of a regulatory program
focused on climate change mitigation—creates another challenge,
since it cuts off a potentially valuable source of funding. Protecting
biodiversity usually means protecting or restoring habitat, and
protecting or restoring habitat usually costs money. That money
typically comes from one of three sources.131 The first is taxpayer
dollars, and while public money protects thousands of acres every
128. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 41, at 59–60.
129. See supra notes 83–102 and accompanying text.
130. See generally Blake Hudson, Coastal Land Loss and the Mitigation–
Adaptation Dilemma: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 73 LA. L. REV. 31 (2012)
(documenting intense development pressure in many coastal areas); Carol M.
Rose, The Story of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between
Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237,
242–45 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) (discussing the
history of increasing demands upon coastal areas).
131. Of course, monitoring habitat or species conditions, engaging in
planning processes, building simulation models, and conducting scientific
research are all key components of the Services’ proposed strategies for
adapting to sea-level rise, and they all require money as well.
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year, no public resource is unlimited.132 The second is private
fundraising, and that asset, though important, cannot protect
enough habitat to sustain most species, particularly if those species
depend upon expensive coastal real estate.133 Voluntary purchases
are therefore likely to be important—perhaps necessary—
components of protective strategies, but they are by no means
sufficient. Consequently, in many areas of environmental and land
use regulation, a third funding source has become increasingly
important. That source is mitigation funding, which regulators
exact from permit applicants as compensation for the
environmental impacts that those applicants’ proposed activities
will create.134
Unfortunately, mitigation funding currently holds little promise
for addressing the biodiversity impacts of sea-level rise. For
mitigation funding to be a viable approach, several conditions must
exist. First, a regulated actor must be in the process of applying for
a permit or some other sort of discretionary approval. Without such
an application, regulators will have no opportunity to exact funding
in exchange for permits. With sea-level rise, that condition often
will be absent, at least in the immediate geographic areas where
species are at risk.135 In some of those areas, there may be few
proposals for additional development—the threat to species will
derive from the combination of sea-level rise and existing
development patterns—and the absence of discretionary approvals
will deprive regulators of any opportunity to exact funding. Even
132. See Rob Hotokainen, President Meets Resistance on Federal
Conservation Fund, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2011, at A19 (describing historic
underfunding of the Land and Water Conservation Fund and resistance to
funding increases).
133. See Paul Voosen, Myth-Busting Scientist Pushes Greens Past Reliance
on ‘Horror Stories’, GREENWIRE (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/
Greenwire/2012/04/03/1 (describing the realization by The Nature Conservancy,
the largest conservation purchase group in the world, that a purely purchasebased strategy would not be sufficient to preserve biodiversity). See generally
John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the
Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2005) (discussing the
appeal and the limitations of this approach).
134. See generally Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next
Generation of Mitigation: Advancing Conservation Through Landscape-Level
Mitigation Planning, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10023 (2010).
135. ESA section 7’s consultation requirement applies only to discretionary
actions requiring federal authorization or funding. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(2006); 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009) (“Section 7 and the requirements of this part
apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or
control.”). Where development has already occurred, that discretionary action is
absent, and even where new development is proposed, federal permits are often
unnecessary.
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where development is happening, it may not require federal
permits and therefore may not trigger the oversight of agencies
focused on biodiversity protection. Absent the need for a wetlands
permit or federal highway funding, most development projects are
subject only to state or local discretionary review.136
Second, mitigation funding approaches succeed best when the
project’s sponsor has some sort of appreciating asset—when land
is about to become a housing development, for example—and the
sponsor can treat the reduction in profits as a cost of doing
business.137 In many areas threatened by sea-level rise, the
opposite circumstance exists. Land values are eventually likely to
decline, not appreciate, because flooded land is usually worth
less.138 Consequently, regulators seeking funding for species
protection would be imposing additional losses, not extracting
value from appreciating assets. That is an awfully difficult, and
potentially a rather inequitable, thing to do.
Despite those limitations, a regulatory approach partly
premised on mitigation funding could still work, at least in theory.
There are activities that contribute to sea-level rise, are subject to
discretionary federal oversight, and generate a lot of money. New
oil leases and new power plants, for example, often require federal
approvals, generate significant greenhouse gas emissions, and
produce big profits.139 Therefore, these activities could be sources
for mitigation funding. But the Services say they will never
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from those activities.140 Again,
their reluctance is understandable; it may even represent a canny
judgment that they can come closest to fulfilling their protective
136. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (emphasizing “the States’ traditional and
primary power over land and water use”).
137. See Wilkinson & Bendick, supra note 134, at 10024 (noting the
willingness of developers to treat mitigation payments “as a cost of doing
business”); DANIEL S. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 269–321 (2011)
(discussing multiple studies demonstrating people’s greater willingness to
forego part of an anticipated financial gain than to absorb a numerically
equivalent loss).
138. See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 36, at 1 (projecting
approximately $1.6 billion of lost property value on Big Pine Key under a worstcase sea-level rise scenario).
139. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE
OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 55–85 (2011) (describing federal regulatory oversight
over oil exploration); Clifford Kraus, Higher Prices Buoy Profits as Oil
Companies Scramble for New Fields, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at B3,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/business/global/exxon-andshell-earnings.html.
140. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
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mission by saving their limited political capital for other fights.
But even if it reflects a certain harsh realism, that judgment still
forecloses access to one of the few funding sources large enough
turn the Services’ nonregulatory agenda from an appealing
aspiration into a practical reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
As I wrote this Essay, the North Carolina Legislature was
considering a bill that would have mandated ignorance of the
science of sea-level rise.141 The legislation, which passed the state
senate before it was rejected its house of representatives, would
have precluded government agencies from acknowledging the
near-unanimous scientific predictions that sea-level rise will
accelerate and, instead, would have required them to assume a
continuation of historic trends.142 The proposal inspired its fair
share of comedic ridicule, but it illustrates the serious dilemma in
which the Services—and, indeed, any agency charged with
addressing the impacts of sea-level rise or of climate change more
generally—find themselves.143 They know the extent of the
problem they face, and they have, on paper, the tools to respond.
But environmental law in practice is often quite different from
environmental law on the books, and the political climate in which
government agencies operate plays a huge role in defining the
discrepancies.144 At present, that political climate is incredibly
hostile to regulatory responses to environmental problems.
Sometimes it is hostile to any acknowledgement that those
problems even exist.
So what, then, are the Services to do? At a minimum, they
should continue their present initiatives. Educating the public
141. John Murawski, Senate Approves Law that Challenges Sea Level
Science: Lawmaker Calls Climate Change Forecasts Unreliable, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, June 13, 2012, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/06/13/
3313953/senate-approves-law-that-challenges.html.
142. See id.; Leigh Phillips, Sea Versus Senators, 486 NATURE 450 (2012),
available at http://www.nature.com/news/sea-versus-senators-1.10893 (describing
the bill, as well as the Atlantic Ocean’s refusal to accommodate the North Carolina
Senate).
143. See, e.g., The Colbert Report: The Word: Sink or Swim (Comedy
Central television broadcast June 4, 2012), available at http://www.
colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/414796/june-04-2012/the-word--sink-or-swim.
144. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously:
Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999) (discussing pervasive gaps between statutory
mandates and actual practices).
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about the threats posed by sea-level rise is clearly important. That
education can help correct common misconceptions about climate
change, and it also can connect the problem, which to many people
seems distant and abstract, with impacts and changes close to
home.145 Similarly, developing simulation models and
informational resources can be a valuable service to private land
managers and can also help local governments as they engage in
land-use planning and make decisions about specific development
proposals.146 Even those modest initiatives will not be free of
controversy; as North Carolina’s legislative initiative shows, even
providing information can be perceived as a threatening act.147
Nevertheless, those modest actions are likely to be less
controversial than more traditional regulatory responses, and they
also can help lay foundations for more robust responses, if and
when those responses occur.
Similarly, the Services could make several modest adjustments
to the regulatory programs that they are already implementing. The
Services should be anticipating sea-level rise in more of their
critical habitat designations, even if they cannot anticipate with
perfect accuracy where ideal habitat will emerge. The Services
should likewise increase their efforts to use the section 7 process to
protect species from other contributing threats.148 Neither of these
shifts will be easy to achieve, but the alternative—leaving
potentially important habitat undesignated and other stresses only
lightly checked, at least until species’ circumstances leave no other
option—is even worse. It would merely postpone the inevitable
conflicts until the impacted species’ desperate circumstances
remove almost all flexibility to craft a creative response.149 The
145. Of course, ample research has demonstrated that providing additional
information about climate change does not always influence people’s views
because people are quite good at filtering out information that does not conform
to their previous ideas or support their self-interest. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et
al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived
Climate Change Risks, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (May 27, 2012),
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate1547.html.
146. For a general discussion of the potential benefits of such information,
see Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental
Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
147. See Murawski, supra note 141 (describing legislators’ fears that
acknowledging the risks of rising seas would depress property values).
148. See generally Craig, supra note 54, 43–44 (emphasizing the importance
of reducing non climate stressors).
149. For a general discussion of the problems with allocating the burdens of
uncertainty to protected species, rather than to resource users, see Dave Owen,
Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CALFED, 37
ENVTL. L. 1145 (2007).
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Services should also provide formalized, written guidance on
designating critical habitat and on implementing section 7 in the
face of climate change.150 Designating critical habitat and
negotiating project adjustments and changes are not easy things to
do; action agencies and project proponents are generally interested
in minimizing expenses and time commitments, not protecting
species. Guidance on accounting for climate change during ESA
implementation processes could provide staff-level regulators with
some valuable backing.151 The Services’ present documents, which
evince a commitment to everything but traditional regulation, do
exactly the opposite.152
In combination, a mix of slight adjustments to existing
regulatory programs and an aggressive education, research, and
outreach effort might actually do quite a lot to protect some
species. Not all states, municipalities, or even private landowners
are in a rush to convert habitats, particularly in the present real
estate market, and information that can inform local environmental
protection strategies will sometimes be put to use. Indeed, state and
local governments have public safety reasons for wanting to keep
human uses out of areas likely to be altered by sea-level rise, for
those areas, almost by definition, are dangerous places to build.153
By combining those incentives with the natural aversion of most
landowners to legal risk, the Services might actually be able to
protect some significant areas of coastal habitat. If they can work
collaboratively with other federal programs that affect
development in coastal areas, like the National Flood Insurance
Program, the potential for protection may be even greater.154
Nevertheless, in many areas, this combination of approaches
will almost certainly be insufficient. No amount of education or
150. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting the absence of any
guidance on using section 7 to address climate change adaptation).
151. For a discussion of the dynamics of these negotiations, see Owen, supra
note 47, at 174.
152. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
153. See Justin Gillis, Sea Level Rise Seen as Threat to 3.7 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, March 14, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/
science/earth/study-rising-sea-levels-a-risk-to-coastal-states.html. Of course,
North Carolina’s recent legislative efforts suggest that some state and local
governments would rather pretend those hazards do not exist. See Murawski,
supra note 141.
154. For a general description of the NFIP program and its role in coastal
development, see Raymond J. Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain
Management: The US Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS 111 (2001). A few
litigants have sought to compel consultation on floodplain mapping. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151
(W.D. Wash. 2004) (requiring consultation).

2012]

SEA-LEVEL RISE AND THE ESA

149

outreach will save the threatened species of the Florida Keys if sea
levels continue to rise.155 Neither will there ever be enough money
available to simply place coastal habitats in preservation status. In
some areas, the only way to stop sea-level rise from exterminating
species will be to first slow and then, eventually, to stop sea-level
rise. And unless some geoengineering scheme emerges as the
white knight riding to our rescue, that means limiting greenhouse
gas emissions.
Consequently, this Essay ends with a rather unoriginal
suggestion. The most promising legal fix for sea-level rise, as for
most of the environmental problems arising from climate change,
lies in a combination of domestic legislation that drastically
reduces greenhouse gas emissions and international agreements
that commit other countries to do the same. At present, that
combination of legislation and international agreements may seem
unattainable. To many opponents of environmental regulation, it
also seems rather undesirable. And even if effective treaties and
legislation were suddenly in place, existing emissions will continue
to raise sea levels for years to come; the changes would simply be
smaller.156 But without those legal changes, the challenges of
rising seas will be too much for many of our coastal species to
survive.

155. See Maschinski et al., supra note 12 (evaluating threats to species in the
Florida Keys); THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 36 (mapping scenarios
for rising seas; eventually, very little land remains).
156. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 23,
at 317 (“Sea-level rise has substantial inertia and will continue beyond 2100 for
many centuries.”).

